A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a 1 k -dominant strategy which is initially played by a positive fraction of the population. Then if the population size is large enough, play converges to the 1 k -dominant equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability.
Introduction
Multiplicity of equilibria creates fundamental difficulties for predicting behavior in non-cooperative games. These difficulties are most conspicuous in coordination games. Since strict equilibria satisfy virtually all equilibrium refinements proposed in the literature, games with multiple strict equilibria do not admit a single, obviously correct prediction of play.
In this paper, we address this issue using a simple evolutionary model. In our model, a fixed population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game, G. Players myopically adjust their strategy choices in response to their opponents' current behavior.
Many models of evolution assume that players know the current population state when deciding how to act. However, one might expect precise information about the population's behavior to be difficult or costly to obtain. For this reason, it seems more consistent with the assumption of myopia to have players base their decisions on limited information about opponents' play. To capture this notion as simply as possible, we assume that when a player receives an opportunity to update his behavior, he draws a sample of k ≥ 2 players from the population. He then chooses a best response to the distribution of behavior within his sample, viewing it as representative of the behavior of the population as a whole. Surprisingly, this model can generate unique predictions of play, even in games with multiple strict equilibria. Suppose that G has a 1 k -dominant strategy which is initially played by a positive fraction of the population. We establish that if the population size is large enough, play converges to the 1 k -dominant equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability. Thus, in some coordination games, when players have limited information about opponents' behavior, almost global convergence to a single equilibrium is virtually guaranteed.
Our model does not offer a unique prediction of play in every coordination game: in generic 2 x 2 games, a unique prediction is guaranteed only if the sample size is two. Still, it seems natural to assume that the sample size k is small; while this does not ensure a unique prediction in every game, it does create unique predictions for many games. Moreover, our conclusions for games which do possess a 1 k -dominant equilibrium are quite strong: populations learn to play the predicted equilibrium from nearly all initial conditions, even when other strict equilibria are available.
To shed more light on our conclusions, we find it useful to contrast them with those that have been obtained using models of stochastic stability (e.g., Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993a) ). These models introduce rare mutations to some underlying evolutionary process in order to establish the existence of a unique stochastically stable equilibrium. By definition, such an equilibrium is very likely to be played by the population in the sufficiently distant future.
The uniqueness of the stochastically stable prediction relies on the ergodicity of the perturbed evolutionary process. Unfortunately, ergodicity brings with it the undesirable consequence that the predicted equilibrium is played and then abandoned an infinite number of times. In addition, if a strict equilibrium which is not stochastically stable is reached first, this equilibrium should be expected to persist; in some specifications, the expected amount of time before the equilibrium is departed grows exponentially in the population size.
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In our model, convergence occurs with high probability from nearly all initial conditions; becoming stuck at the wrong equilibrium is much less of an issue. Convergence is also permanent: once the population reaches the 1 k -dominant equilibrium, it never departs. Finally, while the large population sizes which are natural to consider in evolutionary contexts can create tensions within stochastic stability models, they make our results easier to prove. However, we shall see that our conclusions are not dependent on having a very large population: the predictions of our model still have force when the population is moderate in size.
The Theorem
, π be an n strategy symmetric game. If ∆ denotes the simplex in R n , then each π i : ∆ → R represents the payoffs to strategy s i as a function of the proportion of players choosing each strategy. Following Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) , we say that strategy Our results will concern games with 1 k -dominant strategies, where k ≥ 2 is an integer. For examples of these games, consider the class of n x n pure coordination games, which satisfy Π ii > 0 for all i and Π ij = 0 for all pairs ij with i ≠ j. Suppose that Π 11 = c and that Π ii ∈ (0, 1] for all i ≠ 1. Then it is easily verified that strategy s 1 is 1 kdominant whenever c > k -1. If in addition Π ii = 1 for some i ≠ 1, the converse statement also holds.
We model the evolution of play as a Markov process. The game G is played repeatedly by a population of N players. The random vector
,...,
represents the number of players choosing strategies s 1 through s n at times t = 0, 1, … ; by definition,
During each period, one player is chosen at random from the population and given the opportunity to revise his strategy choice.
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In many models of evolution (e.g., Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) ), it is assumed that the player granted the revision opportunity learns the exact distribution of strategies in the population and plays a best response to this distribution. Under this specification, there is an absorbing state with a nonnegligible basin of attraction corresponding to each strict equilibrium of the game.
In many settings where evolutionary models are appropriate, it may be more natural to assume that players have limited information about opponents'
behavior. To capture this, we suppose that the player who receives the revision opportunity randomly samples k ≥ 2 players from the population and learns their 2
In making this comparison with normal form games we implicitly assume that players can be randomly matched against themselves. When the population size is large, the effect of forbidding self-matching become negligible; hence, ruling out self-matching would not alter our main result.
behavior. He then plays a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. 4 Clearly, all strict equilibria of G correspond to absorbing states of this Markov process. But because of the randomness in the sampling procedure, the population can converge to any of these absorbing states from any interior initial condition. Nevertheless, we are able to show that if one equilibrium is 1 k -dominant, a large population is nearly certain to converge to it from nearly all initial conditions. We call strategy s i asymptotically almost globally stable if for all δ > 0, lim lim , ,
In words: s i is asymptotically almost globally stable if for any positive δ and ε , there exists an N = N(δ, ε) with the following property: if the population size exceeds N and at least proportion δ of the population initially plays s i , then the probability that play converges to the state in which all players choose s i exceeds 1 -ε.
We are now able to state our main result. We first offer intuition for the case in which G has exactly two strategies: s 1 , which is 1 k -dominant, and s 2 , which is also a strict equilibrium. Suppose that the current proportion of s 1 players is x. Let D(x) be the draw rate for strategy s 1 : the probability that the player who is given the opportunity to switch strategies is an s 1 player. Clearly, D(x) = x. Similarly, let C(x) be the choice rate for strategy s 1 : the probability that the player given the chance to switch chooses strategy s 1 . Since s 1 is 1 k -dominant, and since the sample size is k, strategy s 2 will only be chosen when all 4 For simplicity, we assume that samples are drawn with replacement; allowing sampling without replacement would not alter our main result. In the event that a player has multiple best responses to a particular sample, his behavior can be specified arbitrarily.
Theorem: If s i is
Models of evolution with incomplete sampling have also been considered by Young (1993a Young ( , 1993b , Hurkens (1995) , Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Sáez-Martí and Weibull (1999) . In these models, players choose best responses to an incomplete memory of past play rather than an incomplete sample of current behavior. k players queried choose s 2 . Therefore, the probability that s 1 is chosen is C(x) = 1 -(1 -x) k . We can compute the expected change in the number of s 1 players as
which is strictly positive whenever x ∈ (0, 1). 5 Therefore, whenever the population is not at an absorbing state, the expected change in the number of s 1 players is positive. But when the population size is sufficiently large, the course of evolution is almost completely governed by the expected direction of motion. We are therefore able to show that for any positive initial proportion of s 1 players, if the population size is large enough, convergence to the state in which all players choose s 1 is virtually guaranteed. Now suppose there are more than two strategies, but that s 1 is still 1 k -dominant. While the draw rate is unchanged, the choice rate can now depend on the distribution of behavior among strategies besides s 1 . However, since s 1 is 1 kdominant, the choice rate must be at least 1 - (1 -x) k . Thus, the expected change i n the number of s 1 players remains positive. We can therefore still establish asymptotically almost global convergence to the 1 k -dominant equilibrium.
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Our definition of stability contains a limit in the population size N. This allows us to consider arbitrarily large populations when establishing convergence probabilities close to 1. How large a population do we actually need? To address this question, we let s i be a 1 k -dominant strategy, and define the population bound N by
Suppose that at the onset of play, at least proportion δ of the population plays strategy s i . Then if the population size is at least N( , ) δ ε , convergence to the 1 kdominant equilibrium will occur with a probability of at least 1 -ε.
We now show that this bound grows slowly as δ and ε become small.
is observed by Chu (1993) in an evolutionary model of law enforcement.
It is worth noting that when k = 1, evolution is essentially random. For example, when G is a coordination game, the draw and choice rates for each strategy are always equal, and each component of the evolutionary process is a martingale. Corollary 2 shows that the population sizes needed for our predictions to be relevant are not large, even if few players initially choose the 1 k -dominant strategy, and even if we demand a probability of convergence very close to 1. In particular, as we lower the probability ε of a failure to converge, the bound N only grows as the logarithm of ε −1 : small populations can learn to play the 1 k -dominant equilibrium with very high probabilities.
The proof of these results implicitly defines an algorithm for computing convergence probabilities, the running time of which is linear in the population size. Using this algorithm, we can determine exact population bounds N( , ) δ ε for specific choices of δ and ε. In Table 1 , we present bounds for the case in which k = 2; these bounds are valid when the game G has a 1 2 -dominant equilibrium and the sample size is 2. The population sizes needed to ensure convergence to the 1 2 -dominant equilibrium are quite small. For example, if at least 5% of the population initially chooses the 1 2 -dominant strategy, the probability of a failure to converge to the 1 2 -dominant equilibrium is less than one in a million whenever the population size is at least 381. Table 2 contains population bounds for the case in which k = 5, which are valid when the game G has a Moreover, as the tables illustrate, the larger samples allow us to guarantee convergence to the equilibrium in smaller populations. That most of the numbers in the tables have last digit 1 is a consequence of the discreteness of t h e state space. For example, if N = 100, there is a state at which exactly 10% of the population plays strategy s 1 , while if N = 101, all states at which at least 10% play s 1 actually have at least 11/101 ≈ 10.89% playing s 1 . For this reason, when δ = .10 the probabilities of failures to converge drop discretely after each multiple of 10, leading the population bounds to occur at these points. Table 2 : Population bounds N( , ) δ ε when k = 5.
The Proof
As above, we begin with the case in which G has exactly two strategies: a 1 kdominant strategy s 1 , and a strict equilibrium strategy s 2 . We find it convenient to speak in terms of the number of players who are not playing the risk dominant strategy: define For the number of players choosing strategy s 2 to increase, the player who is given the opportunity to switch strategies must initially be playing s 1 , and he must draw a sample which consists solely of s 2 players. Hence, for z ∈ {0,
Similarly, for Y t N to fall, the player given the chance to switch must be playing s 2 , and his sample must contain at least one player choosing s 1 . Therefore,
We now define three functions which will prove useful. Define ρ: (0, 1) → R by 
Let T 
This completes the proof of the case in which G is a two strategy coordination game. We now consider the general case. t N in the current period will typically differ from transition probabilities which also condition on the values in past periods.
To prove the result, we will establish that φ 
, and the result follows from the analysis above.
To show that φ 
